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INSURANCE LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, the New Mexico judiciary addressed several
issues involving the Uninsured Motorist Statute, including an insured's

option to reject coverage,' stacking, 2 and punitive damages." The judiciary
also addressed the initial permission rule with regard4 to the Permissive
Driver Clause, and its applicability in New Mexico. Additionally, the
agreeappellate courts discussed several issues concerning general policy
5
rescission
ments, including an agent's authority6 to bind the insurer,
and an insurance company's duty
because of material misrepresentations,
7
insured.
to defend the
II.

NEW MEXICO UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE

Overview of the Statute
New Mexico's Uninsured Motorist Statutes requires that all automobile
and that this
insurance policies contain coverage for uninsured motorists
9 The adoption
well.
as
coverage
motorist
underinsured
include
coverage
0
of the statute grew out the inability of the financial responsibilities laws'
to protect innocent victims from uninsured tortfeasors."
The legislature sought to provide protection to these innocent victims,
who are injured through no fault of their own, through the Uninsured
Motorist Statute.' The Uninsured Motorist Statute expanded insurance
coverage so the "injured policy holder" would be placed in the same
position, with regard to damages, "that he would have been if the
3
tortfeasor had possessed liability insurance."' The Statute mandates that

A.

1. Romero v. Dairyland, 111 N.M. 154, 803 P.2d 243 (1990).
2. Richardson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 73, 811 P.2d 571 (1991); Horne v. USF&G, 109
N.M. 786, 791 P.2d 61 (1990); Vigil v. California Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 67, 811 P.2d 565 (1991).
3. Stinbrink v. Farmers Ins. Co., IIl N.M. 179, 803 P.2d 664 (1990).
4. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990).
5. Ellingwood v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co., III N.M. 301, 805 P.2d 70 (1991).
6. Id.
7. American General Fire and Casualty Co. v. Progressive Casualty Co., 110 N.M. 741, 799
P.2d 1113 (1990).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
9. An underinsured motorist is defined as "an operator of a motor vehicle whose limit of
liability coverage under all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the time of the accident
is less than the limits of liability under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage." Id. § 66-5301(B). By including underinsured coverage within the uninsured motorist statute, the legislature
intended to protect not only the innocent victims of uninsured tortfeasors, but also those innocent
victims injured by inadequately insured tortfeasors. Konnick v. Farmers, 103 N.M. I12, 703 P.2d
889 (1985).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to -239 (1978).
I!.Chavez v. State Farm, 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975).
12. Id.
13. Sandoval v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 705, 708, 580 P.2d 131, 134 (Ct. App. 1978).
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this coverage be compulsory, but at the same time allows the insured to
reject the uninsured motorist coverage. 14
B.

Option to Reject Coverage
5 the
In Romero v. Dairyland,1
New Mexico Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the insured rejecting uninsured motorist coverage. The New
Mexico Uninsured Motorist Statute does not specify how one may reject
uninsured motorist coverage.' 6 In order to clarify rejection of coverage,
the Superintendent of Insurance promulgated a regulation specifying the
requirements to reject uninsured motorist coverage.' 7 The regulation states:
The rejection of the provisions covering damage caused by an uninsured or unknown motor vehicle as required in writing by the
provisions of Section 66-5-301 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1978
Compilation, must be endorsed, attached, stamped or otherwise made
a part of the policy of bodily injury and property damage insurance.'
In Romero, the supreme court held that an insured may reject uninsured
motorist coverage, but the rejection must satisfy the regulations promulgated by the Superintendent of Insurance.19
At age fifty nine, Josie Romero, a widow, bought automobile insurance
for the first time and purchased the minimum liability coverage required
under the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act. 2° Upon purchasing the
policy, Romero signed an uninsured motorist rejection form. 2' Because
the agent did not explain to Romero the various forms she was required
to sign, Romero asserted that she did not understand what she was
signing.22 She was not given a copy of the rejection form and the
declarations page of her policy did not document the rejection of the
coverage. 23 The rejection form was not attached to Romero's policy. 24
Romero was injured when a car, in which she was a passenger, was
hit by an uninsured motorist. 25 Romero attempted to claim damages under
her policy with Dairyland but was refused on grounds that she had
rejected uninsured motorist coverage. 26 Romero sued Dairyland for misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. 27 Romero appealed a summary

14.
15.
16.
17.
5, pt.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
111 N.M. 154, 803 P.2d 243 (1990).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(C) (1978).
Romero, 111 N.M. at 155, 803 P.2d at 244 (citing New Mexico Dep't of Ins. Regs., art.
4, ch. 66, rule 1, 5-1-4 (undated)).
Id.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to -239 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
Romero, 111 N.M. at 155, 803 P.2d at 244.
Id. at 156, 803 P.2d at 245.
Id. at 157, 803 P.2d at 246.
Id. at 155, 803 P.2d at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judgment entered against her, claiming that her written rejection of
uninsured motorist coverage was invalid.2
Because the public policy underlying the uninsured motorist statute is
to guarantee that insured drivers are protected against uninsured motorists,
the supreme court stated that exceptions to the coverage must be strictly
construed. 29 The court held that an insured may reject the uninsured
motorist coverage, but the rejection must satisfy the requirements set
forth by the Superintendent of Insurance. The insured must also be
well informed about the decision to reject the coverage or the rejection
is invalid. 3' Because Romero's policy did not meet the Superintendent's
requirements and because she was not well informed in 3 2her decision to
reject the coverage, the court held the rejection invalid.
This holding by the supreme court is consistent with the New Mexico
Uninsured Motorist Statute and the subsequent rules of rejection promulgated by the Superintendent of Insurance. Romero serves as additional
clarification of the Uninsured Motorist Statute and as an insight into
the supreme court's strict interpretation of the option to reject uninsured
motorist coverage.
C. Coverage
1. Multiple Vehicles Under Single Policy
injury and
The uninsured motorist statute is intended to cover bodily
33 As long as
vehicle.
single
a
of
therefore does not relate to coverage
the minimum coverage applies to each vehicle under the policy, it is not
necessary for each vehicle to separately carry uninsured motorist coverage.3 4 The statute does not prevent the insured from obtaining coverage
beyond the statutory limit.3
2. Stacking
Although it is not necessary for an insured to carry uninsured motorist
coverage on each vehicle insured, most policies provide the uninsured
motorist coverage for each vehicle. When separate premiums for uninsured
to
motorist coverage are paid on each vehicle, the insured is entitled
36 Stackpolicies.
between
also
and
policy
"stack" the coverage within the
ing allows the insured to collect the total coverage of the policy, not
just the coverage provided for the vehicle involved in the accident.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 159, 803 P.2d at 248.
Id. at 156, 803 P.2d at 245.
Id. at 157, 803 P.2d at 246.
Id.
Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. Inc., 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982).
Id.
Id. The statutory limits are set forth in N.M. STAT. ANN. section 66-5-215 (1978).
Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 103 N.M. 112, 114, 703 P.2d 889, 891 (1985).
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New Mexico has established two principles for analyzing stacking cases.37
First, an insurance company has the duty to specifically exclude stacking
if the expectation of stacking is raised in the insured.38 This expectation
is most commonly raised by the payment of separate premiums on each
vehicle, which causes the insured to believe that each car carries Uninsured
Motorist coverage. 3 9 There would be no misunderstanding, however, if
the uninsured realized that in reality the coverage is attached to the
insured, not the car.4
Second, if an insurance company includes a clause excluding stacking
in the policy, it will be enforced only if 1) it is unambiguous and 2) is
not in direct conflict with statutory public policy. 4' When insurance
contracts are examined for ambiguity, a slightly different approach is
taken in comparison to most other contracts. 42 A typical contract emphasizes the importance of the bargain, while ambiguity analysis of an
insurance contract does not include the bargain aspect.4 3 Most insurance
companies draft their own policies, and in turn enter into the contract
with more knowledge than the insured. Consequently, the insurance company enjoys an advantage in the bargaining position over the purchaser
of the7 insurance. To minimize this advantage, courts construe any ambiguity in the insurance contract in favor of the insured. 44
Because New Mexico has adopted the Uninsured Motorist Statute, a
clause excluding stacking of uninsured motorist coverage is in violation
of statutory public policy. 45 This holds especially true when the insured
has paid separate premiums for uninsured motorist coverage on each
vehicle.4 During the survey period, the court analyzed the application
of stacking to two different situations. The first involved permissive users
driving the insured vehicle; 47 the second concerned employees operating
an employer's insured vehicle.48

37. Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 783 P.2d 465 (1989).
38. Id. at 158, 783 P.2d at 468.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 160, 783 P.2d at 470. For example, if an insured pedestrian is hit by an uninsured
motorist the insured will be entitled to the full coverage under the automobile insurance policy.
Id. Consequently, if the insured carries $10,000 of coverage on three vehicles, she is entitled to
$30,000 in coverage. The inconsistency arises when an insured is hit by an uninsured motorist while
occupying an insured vehicle. Id. The policy may appear to limit the coverage to the $10,000 listed
on the declarations page with respect to the vehicle involved. Id. However, this is contrary to the
insured's reasonable expectations. Id. An insured expects to carry the maximum coverage while
occupying an insured vehicle. It would be absurd for the insured to receive more coverage if injured
while outside an insured vehicle than if injured while occupying one of the insured vehicles. Id.
To avoid this absurdity, stacking is permitted.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 159, 783 P.2d at 469.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M 322, 757 P.2d 792 (1988). The legislature
adopted the public policy of compensating insured persons who are injured through no fault of
their own. Id. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794.
46. Id.

47. Richardson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 112 N.M. 73, 811 P.2d 571 (1991).
48. Home v. USF&G, 109 N.M. 786, 791 P.2d 61 (1990).
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49
In Richardson v. FarmersInsuranceCo., Howard Mickelson purchased
three insurance policies from Farmers and paid three separate premiums
50
for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Each policy provided
$25,000 coverage per person for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and each policy defined the limit of liability as "the total limits
for each separate underinsured motorist premium paid."'" In addition,
the policy did not restrict the limit of liability to the named insured2 or
to "Class IP insureds, i.e., family members of the named insured.
On July 24, 1986, Cathi Richardson was driving one of Mickelson's
insured vehicles, with his permission, 3 when she was rear-ended by an
underinsured motorist, Castillo. Castillo was insured for $25,000 under
public liability coverage. 4 Richardson suffered a severe back injury, which
led to surgery and $95,000 in damages." Richardson settled with Castillo
for $25,000 and received $25,000 from Farmers for coverage under the
policy for the Mickelson vehicle she was driving when the accident
coverage in order
occurred.5 6 She then attempted to stack Mickelson's
7
Farmers.
from
$50,000
another
to recover
Farmers refused to pay the coverage, claiming that Richardson was
not a member of the Mickelson family nor a named insured under the
8
policies and therefore was not entitled to stacked coverage. Richardson
filed suit for declaratory judgment in order to stack the coverage from
the other two insured vehicles.5 9 The trial court found, as a matter of
law, that Richardson was not permitted to stack coverage and therefore
6
0
granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. Richardson appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found the issue to pertain to the
limit of liability under the policy, rather than a question of Class I or
Class II stacking. 6' Therefore, the supreme court examined the policy for
62 "A
any ambiguity that existed with regard to the limit of liability.
contract is deemed ambiguous only if it is reasonably and fairly susceptible

49. 112 N.M. 73, 811 P.2d 571 (1991).
50. Id.
51. Id. Each policy contained the following provision:
If more than one premium is paid for uninsured motorists under this or other
policies issued by the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the limit of liability
will be the total limits for each separate uninsured motorists premium.
Id. at 73-74, 811 P.2d at 571-72.
52. Id. at 73, 811 P.2d at 571.
53. Id.at 74, 811 P.2d at 572.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 73, 811 P.2d at 571. Class I insureds are household members and are permitted to
stack policy benefits. Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 109 N.M. 555, 557, 787 P.2d 838, 837 (1990).
In contrast, Class II insureds are third party passengers and are not permitted to stack policy
coverage. Id.
62. Richardson, 112 N.M. at 73, 811 P.2d at 571.
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The supreme court analyzed three of Farm-

ers' policies and found that each unambiguously permitted stacking. 64
First, the policies defined an insured person as "any other person ...

occupying your insured car." ' 6 Because Richardson was occupying the

car when injured, she was an insured person under the policy. 66 Second,

Farmers contracted to pay "all sums which an insured person is legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle." ' 67 Finally, Farmers permitted stacking by "defining the
limit of liability to be the total limits for each separate underinsured
motorist premium paid.""

Because the clauses were unambiguous, Richardson was permitted to

stack the underinsured motorist benefits of the three policies. 69 The

supreme court reversed-the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
Farmers and entered summary judgment for Richardson. 70

In Home v. USF&G, 7' the court confronted an issue of first impression
in New Mexico: Whether an employee insured under a business' uninsured
motorist rider policy can stack benefits on other covered vehicles when
Class I insureds are defined as "you or any family member.' ' 2 The court
held that an employee may stack uninsured motorist coverage within a
policy when the policy is ambiguous and does not explicitly define the
73
employee as a Class II insured.
Horne, while driving during the course of his employment, was involved
in an accident caused by a negligent uninsured driver. 74 The vehicle Horne
was driving was one of the five company vehicles insured under New
Mexico Security Patrol's company policy.75 The policy was a business
policy but provided a rider for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 76 The language in the rider policy was that used for family and
individual coverage, defining the insured as "you or any family member."" Each vehicle under the policy had uninsured motorist coverage. 78
As a result of the accident, Horne became a paraplegic. 79 His damages
from the injury exceeded $300,OO0
USF&G paid Horne $60,000 from
63. Id. at 74, 811 P.2d at 572.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 109 N.M. 786, 791 P.2d 61 (1990).
72. Id. at 786, 791 P.2d at 61. For a definition of Class I insureds, see supra note 71.
73. Home, 109 N.M. at 786, 791 P.2d at 61. For a definition of Class 11 insureds, see supra
note 71.
74. Home, 109 N.M. at 786, 791 P.2d at 61.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court does not state whether separate premiums were paid for each vehicle under
the policy.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the coverage on the vehicle he was driving.8 ' Horne demanded to stack
the coverage from all five vehicles, but USF&G refused on grounds that
Home, as an employee, was a Class II insured and consequently not
entitled to stack.8 2 The claim was arbitrated and decided in favor of
USF&G.13 Home filed for declaratory judgment and the trial court found
for USF&G. 8 Home appealed.8 5
On appeal, USF&G argued that Horne, as an employee of New Mexico
Security Patrol, was not entitled to stack the uninsured/underinsured
86
motorist coverage because he was a Class II insured. The New Mexico
Supreme Court found that USF&G's argument was "begging the question. '8' 7 The supreme court first addressed whether Home was a Class
I or Class II insured. 8 The mere fact that Home was an employee was
not enough to make him a Class II insured; instead, the policy had to
be construed to determine his class status. 9 The principal question for
the court was the meaning of "you or any family member" within a
business policy.90
The uninsured rider provided that three classes or persons were insured:
1) "you or any family member," 2) "Anyone else occupying a covered
auto . . . or a temporary substitute for a covered auto," and 3) "Anyone
for damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury sustained
by another insured." 91 The court found this wording to be ambiguous
when applied to employees because USF&G could have attached a different
92
Conrider to the policy that defined employees as Class II insureds.
93
insured.
the
of
favor
in
construed
was
policy
sequently, the
The court followed the reasoning of King v. Nationwide Insurance
Co., 94 which found that "relatives living in your household," when used5
9
within a business policy, referred to all employees of the company.
Under this interpretation, it is not clear whether an employee is a Class
I or Class II insured. Because of the ambiguity, the policy must be
construed in favor of the insured. 96 Consistent with New Mexico law,
the supreme court ruled that Horne was allowed to stack the coverage
from the other four vehicles under the policy. 97

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 787, 791 P.2d at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 786, 791 P.2d at 61.
Id. at 787, 791 P.2d at 62.
Id.; see also, Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 109 N.M. 555, 787 P.2d 835 (1990).
35 Ohio St. 3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380 (1988).
Home, 109 at 788, 791 P.2d at 63.
Id.
Id.
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This ruling does not change the previous New Mexico cases that prohibit
Class II insureds from stacking policy coverage. Employees are usually
considered Class II insureds; however, Horne, under the ambiguous policy,
was found to be a Class I insured and therefore entitled to stack coverage."

This case sends a clear message to insurers that employees are not
presumed to be Class II insureds. The insurance policy must specifically

define employees as Class II insureds in order to prevent stacking. 9' This
definition must be unambiguous or it will be construed against the
insurer. '0
Another type of coverage that is subject to stacking is medical pay
coverage. Like uninsured motorist coverage, medical pay coverage follows
the person rather than the vehicle.' 0' Therefore, ambiguities arise in
medical pay coverage like those in uninsured motorist coverage. 02 If an
insured paid two premiums on two vehicles and was hit while outside
the vehicles, he/she would be entitled to recover under both policies. 03
In contrast, if the insured were hit while in the vehicle, he/she may be
entitled only to coverage under that particular vehicle's policy .' 4 Like
uninsured motorist coverage, this absurd result is against the insured's
reasonable expectations.' °0
Unlike uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, however, medical pay
coverage is not mandated by statute.'10 Therefore, it is not against public
statutory policy to exclude stacking of medical pay coverage. 7 7 In order
for an insurance company to exclude stacking of medical pay coverage,
'
stacking must be explicitly excluded under the policy. Iu
The stacking of medical pay coverage was a question of first impression
in New Mexico in 1989 and was addressed in Sanchez v. Herrera.'°9 In
Sanchez, the insured, Phillip Sanchez, carried $5,000 of medical coverage
on the vehicle in which the accident occurred." 0 He also carried $5,000
of medical coverage on four other vehicles, which were under separate
policies."' State Farm paid $5,000 in medical coverage to the injured
party, but refused to stack the coverage on the other four insured
vehicles." 2 State Farm argued that the policies restricted coverage to the
specific vehicle, and thus excluded stacking." '3

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 160, 783 P.2d 465, 470 (1989).

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 158, 783 P.2d at 468.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 109 N.M. 155, 158, 783 P.2d 465, 468 (1989).
110. Id.at 156, 783 P.2d at 466.
Ill.

d.

112. Id.
113. Id.
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The court interpreted the statute using traditional methods of contract4
interpretation, because no statutory policy existed regarding medical pay."
The supreme court looked for any ambiguity in the policy that would
mandate that it be construed in favor of the insured."' The relevant
portions of the policy stated:
We will pay for medical expenses for bodily injury sustained by:
a. the first person named in the declarations;
1.
b. his or her spouse; and
c. their relatives.
These persons have to sustain the bodily injury:
a. while they operate or occupy a vehicle covered under the
liability section .... 16
The liability section stated:
We will:
1) pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay
because of:
a. bodily injury to others, and
b. damage to or destruction of property, including loss of its use,
caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use
of your car . . .7
"Your car" was defined as the vehicle described on the Declarations
Page of each policy." 8 Each declaration page listed only one vehicle,
which was the only vehicle insured under that policy." 9
The policy also contained an exclusionary clause that stated:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
4. FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR BODILY INJURY:
a. SUSTAINED WHILE OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING
STRUCK BY A VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR
ANY RELATIVE, WHICH IS NOT INSURED UNDER THIS COVERAGE . . 120
The supreme court found that this policy specifically excluded stacking
of medical pay coverage. 2 ' The supreme court stated that the insured's
expectations did favor stacking because separate premiums were paid for
each vehicle.'" The supreme court, however, found that these expectations
were negated by the exclusionary clause that clearly limited coverage to
the vehicle described in each policy. '21 3 Consequently, the court determined

114. Id. at 158, 783 P.2d at 468.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. Id. at 159, 783 P.2d at 469.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 160, 783 P.2d at 470.
Id.
Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

that the parties had agreed to exclude the stacking of medical pay coverage
from the policy. 24 Because no ambiguity existed, the court enforced the
terms of the contract.'12
During the survey period, another medical pay coverage case was decided
that analyzed stacking of medical pay coverage. In Vigil v. California
Casualty Ins. Co.,126 the insureds had two automobile policies with California Casualty Insurance Company ["California Casualty"]. 2 7 The first
policy insured three vehicles and the second policy insured two vehicles. 28
Each policy provided $5,000 in medical coverage, which was listed on
the Declarations Page associated with each vehicle, excluding one vehicle
on the second policy which did not have medical pay coverage. 29 The
Declarations Page showed that a separate premium was paid with respect
to each vehicle for medical pay coverage. 30
One of the cars, which was covered under the first policy, was involved
in an accident. 3 ' A minor daughter of the insured, who was pregnant,
was driving the vehicle. 3 2 Her mother, one of the insureds, was a passenger
in the vehicle. 1 As a result of the accident, each of the passengers
experienced medical expenses in excess of $5,000.' 34 California Casualty
paid $5,000 to each person but refused to provide further coverage
claiming that the coverage was 3specific to each vehicle and thus excluded
stacking of medical coverage. 1
The insureds brought suit for declaratory judgment against California
Casualty stating that they were entitled to stack medical coverage under
the policies. 36 If stacking was permitted, it would provide $20,000 in
coverage for each of the passengers. 37 The trial court found for the
insureds and issued a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to
stack the medical coverage under the two policies. 3 The trial court found
that the reasonable expectations of the insureds were that coverage would
be stacked because they paid separate premiums on each insured vehicle. 3 9
California Casualty appealed, arguing that the decision was not consistent
with Sanchez v. Herrera.1'4
The New Mexico Supreme Court again used traditional methods of
contract interpretation, because there was no statute requiring the stacking

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
112 N.M. 67, 811 P.2d 565 (1991).
Id. at 67, 811 P.2d at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68, 811 P.2d at 566.

131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
1d.
1d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of medical pay coverage.' 4' The section of the policy defining medical
payments promised to pay:
To or for the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," caused by accident,
a. while occupying the owned vehicle,
b. while occupying a non-owned vehicle, but only if such person has,
or reasonably believes he has, the permission of the owner to use
the automobile and the use is within the scope of such permission,
or
c. through being struck by a moving highway 42vehicle or trailer of
any type while not occupying a motor vehicle.
The Limit of Liability Clause stated:
The limit of liability for medical payments stated in the Declarations
as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the Company's liability
for all expenses incurred by or on behalf of each43 person who sustains
bodily injury as a result of any one accident.'
The supreme court noted that the Limit of Liability Clause made no
reference to any vehicle listed on the Declarations Page and did not
associate the amount of medical coverage with a specific vehicle. 44 The
Declarations Page, however, listed each car separately along with the
medical coverage associated with that individual vehicle. 45 This raised an
ambiguity because the Limit of Liability Clause did not associate coverage
with a particular vehicle. 46 The court stated, "[u]nless the policy explicitly
provides otherwise, there is no particular relationship between the inand the automobile or other
surance benefits available to the' 4insured
7
vehicle involved in the accident. '
The supreme court held that stacking of medical payment coverage
was available under the facts of this case.'14 The supreme court based
its decision on: 1) the ambiguity raised within the policy, 2) the fact
that medical payment coverage, like uninsured motorist coverage, follows
the person rather than the vehicle, and 3) the expectations of stacking
of the insured as a result of paying separate premiums.' 49
This case is consistent with Sanchez. It is clear from these two cases
that the insurance company must be very specific and clear when excluding
stacking of medical pay. If there is any ambiguity, it will be construed
in favor of the insured.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 68, 811 P.2d at 566.
Id.at 69, 811 P.2d at 567.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 70, 811 P.2d at 568.
Id.
Id.
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3. Punitive Damages
In 1986, New Mexico addressed for the first time the question of
whether to require an insurer to pay punitive damages to the insured
under uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 15 0 The supreme court
analyzed the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, which requires that
an insurance policy contain uninsured motorist coverage "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury ... or destruction of property."'' The only requirement
for protection, under the statute, is that the person be legally entitled
to recover damages. Because punitive damages are available in most
negligence actions, the court held that the statute permitted punitive
damages because the injured party would be legally entitled to punitive
52
damages from the tortfeasor.'
In Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,' the New
Mexico Supreme Court noted that the legislative intent behind the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute is to protect the insured, not the
insurance company.'1 The court also recognized that the general principle
behind punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor, not to compensate
the plaintiff.'55 The court reasoned that these principles are not in conflict,
because the insurance company is not precluded from an action against
the tortfeasor for recovery. 56 Requiring the insurer to pay punitive damages merely shifts the burden of suing
the tortfeasor for punitive damages
57
from the insured to the insurer.
In dicta, the supreme court implied that the insurance company could
exclude coverage for punitive damages. 58 An exclusionary clause, however,
is void if it is in conflict with statutory public policy.' 5 9 Therefore, a
clause attempting to exclude punitive damages under uninsured motorist
coverage would be void, because the uninsured motorist statute encompasses punitive damages.16
This issue was clarified in Stinbrink v. Farmers Insurance Co.' 6 1 In
that case William Stinbrink was involved in an accident with an uninsured

150. Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374 (1986).
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (emphasis added).
152. Id. In State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988), the appellate court ruled that punitive
damages cannot be awarded against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. Therefore, an insured may
not recover punitive damages under uninsured motorist coverage from a deceased tortfeasor's insurance
policy, since he is not "legally entitled to recover damages." Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449.
153. 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374 (1986).
154. Id. at 746, 726 P.2d at 1376.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
157. Id.
158. "The prevailing trend, absent an express exclusion in the policy, is to impose liability under
uninsured motorists' insurance for punitive damages." Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377. The court
further noted that State Farm was on notice that an exclusionary clause is a factor in determining
coverage and made no attempt to exclude punitive damages. Id.
159. Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 158, 783 P.2d 465, 468 (1989).
160. Id.
161. I1 N.M. 179, 803 P.2d 664 (1990).
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motorist, whose blood alcohol level registered 0.25 at the time of the
accident.1 62 Stinbrink attempted to recover punitive damages from Farmers
under the uninsured motorist section of his automobile policy. 163 The
policy mandated that the claim be arbitrated. '1
The arbitrators found that the insurance policy specifically excluded
liability for punitive damages in uninsured motorists claims. 65 On appeal,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that because punitive damages are
included in uninsured motorist coverage they cannot be excluded in an
insurance policy. 66 The court addressed the conflict in Stewart v. State
Farm MutualAuto Insurance Co. stating, "[t]he dicta in Stewart conflicts
with the law as articulated in that case and is specifically disavowed."' 67
Therefore, when the rulings of Stewart and Stinbrink are combined it
is clear that New Mexico's uninsured motorist statute contemplates awards
for punitive damages and that liability for punitive damages cannot be
excluded from the policy. 6
III.

PERMISSIVE DRIVER CLAUSE

Initial Permission Rule
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jensen, 69 a case of first impression, the
New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the scope of an insurance policy's
omnibus clause. Gary Caldwell owned automobile insurance with Allstate
Insurance Company. 70 Caldwell and Jensen were both employed on a
bridge construction project in Carlsbad. '71 One night, Jensen entered
Caldwell's room to visit and to borrow Caldwell's truck to drive to a
nearby store to purchase cigarettes. 7 2 Jensen had consumed approximately
three cases of beer in the last twenty-four hours, and drank another beer
A.

162. Id. at 179, 803 P.2d at 664.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. In addition, the arbitrators also found that the policy required each party to bear its
own arbitration costs. Consequently, Stinbrink was not awarded arbitration costs. The supreme
court, on appeal, ruled that arbitration costs may be awarded to the prevailing party, as any other
decision would be contrary to New Mexico's policy of encouraging arbitration. Id.
166. Id. at 180, 803 P.2d at 665.
167. Id.
168. The dissent in Stinbrink argues that the uninsured motorist statute does not mandate that
punitive damages be included in uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 183, 803 P.2d at 668 (Montgomery, J., dissenting). Justice Montgomery argues that Stewart is distinguishable from Stinbrink
because the policy in Stewart did not contain an exclusionary clause and therefore punitive damages
could be awarded, since the insured was legally entitled to recover punitive damages. Id. The policy
in Stinbrink, however, specifically excluded punitive damages under uninsured motorist coverage.
Id. Justice Montgomery argues that the statute does not require that punitive damages be included
in uninsured motorist coverage. Because the policy behind punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor,
requiring insurance companies, rather than the tortfeasor, to pay punitives would be against the
purpose of awarding punitive damages. Id. Therefore, an exclusionary provision should be valid
within the uninsured motorist coverage. Id.
169. 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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in Caldwell's room before borrowing the truck. i3 Caldwell did
ask Jensen
74
if he was able to drive, and Jensen replied affirmatively. '
As Jensen drove away in Caldwell's truck, he headed in the opposite
direction of the convenience store to which he previously referred.7 5 In
the course of his trip, a high speed chase between Jensen and members76
of both the New Mexico State Police and the Carlsbad Police resulted.
The police officers were forced to remove their vehicles from a roadblock
when it became evident that Jensen was not going to slow down for the
blockade. 77 Later, Jensen ran a police officer, James Boutelle, off the
road by swerving his vehicle into the police officer's vehicle. 78 After
Jensen ran another roadblock and destroyed two other police cars, he
79
was arrested and charged with several criminal violations.
Boutelle, the police officer who was injured when Jensen ran him off
the road, brought a claim against Jensen for negligent and intentional
acts, and against Caldwell for negligent entrustment.' ° Allstate sought
a declaratory judgment, claiming that Jensen was not a permissive driver
under the omnibus clause in Caldwell's policy because of his excessive
deviation from the scope of permission.'
Therefore, Allstate claimed
that it had no duty to defend Jensen. 82 The district court ruled that
Allstate did not have a duty to defend Jensen, based upon the "significant
deviation" rule. 8 3 Boutelle appealed.' 8 '
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a permissive driver clause
within an insurance policy must provide coverage to any person using
the insured vehicle with consent.' 5 The policy cannot restrict coverage
through any restrictions or understandings between the parties, regarding
the particular use for which the permission was given.8 6 Coverage, however, does not exist when the permissive driver has an intent to deprive
the owner of the property, or when the driver's actions show a complete
8 7
disregard for the return or safety of the vehicle.
The supreme court articulated three approaches taken by courts in
other jurisdictions, regarding the scope of the omnibus clause. 88 They
include: 1) "the strict rule requiring use precisely within the scope of
permission granted, 2) the initial permission rule covering any deviation

173. Id.
174. Id. at 585, 788 P.2d at 341.
175. Id. at 584, 788 P.2d at 340.
176. Id. at 585, 788 P.2d at 341.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. The policy covered "any ... person [driving] the owned automobile, provided the use
thereof is with the permission of the insured and within the scope of that permission." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

INSURANCE LAW

Summer 1992]

short of theft. . ., and 3) the intermediate significant or major/minor
deviation rule." 18 9
New Mexico's Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act requires that
the liability policy must "insure the person named in the policy and any
other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle with the express
or implied permission of the named insured. . ."19 The court stated that
the policy cannot be more restrictive than the statute, and therefore it
is necessary to construe the meaning of the1 9phrase "with the express or
implied permission of the named insured." '
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the clause must be interpreted broadly in order to effectuate the intent of the legislature in
passing the Mandatory Responsibility Act. ,92 Therefore, the court adopted
the initial permission rule, establishing that the liability policy must cover
permissive drivers regardless of any restrictions or understandings between
the parties. 93 Coverage is excluded in the case of theft or complete
disregard on the part of the permissive driver for the safety or return
of the vehicle.194 The supreme court easily found that Jensen had completely disregarded the safety or return of the vehicle.19 Consequently,
his state of mind vitiated initial permission, and Allstate had no duty
to defend.1 96 The district court ruling was affirmed."97
This case is consistent with prior New Mexico law because it liberally
construes the policy and statute in favor of the insured. Although, there
are no other New Mexico cases on the specific permissive driver issue,
it is apparent that the New Mexico courts are pro-insured in this area
as well as other insurance coverage issues. By adopting the initial permission rule, the permissive driver must completely disregard the safety
or return of the vehicle in order to exceed the permission initially granted.198
The supreme court, applying the intent of the legislature, is seeking to
protect the innocent accident victim from the financially irresponsible
tortfeasor to the greatest extent permitted by law.
IV.

INSURANCE POLICY AGREEMENTS

In New Mexico, an insurance company is bound by the apparent
authority with which an agent is "clothed."' 99 The apparent authority

189. Id.
190. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-221(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
191. Jensen, 109 N.M. at 586, 788 P.2d at 342.
192. Id. at 587, 788 P.2d at 343. The court noted that the legislative purpose reflects the desire
by the legislature that automobile liability insurance benefit the general public, innocent victims in
accidents and insurers. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 588-89, 788 P.2d at 344-45.
195. Id. at 589, 788 P.2d at 345.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Douglass v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Assoc., 42 N.M. 190, 195, 76 P.2d 453, 456
(1937).
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of an agent is that which a reasonably prudent person would assume
from the words and actions of the agent. 2°° Apparent. authority arises
from the principal's manifestations to third parties.20 ' Assigning a person
to a specific position that carries certain duties and responsibilities with
it may give rise to apparent authority. 2 °
In the same light, "[t]he appointment of an agent to solicit insurance
clothes him with very considerable authority, unless the authority implied
by his position is limited, and such limitation called to the attention of
one dealing with him." ' 1 During the survey period, the New Mexico
Supreme Court upheld these principles and found that the issue of whether
an agent had apparent authority to bind the insurance company was a
question of fact for the jury.3
In Elingwood v. N.N. Investors Life Insurance Co.,2 James Streeter
applied for life insurance at age twenty-five with Investors Life Insurance."6 From Streeter's appearance it was apparent that he had scoliosis,
a deformity of the spine."' The insurance company, however, did not
require Streeter to undergo a physical examination or any interview with
a doctor in conjunction with the application for insurance.2
Streeter was interviewed by a company agent.m During the interview
Streeter was asked questions that were printed on the enrollment application form.210 Streeter answered the questions orally to the agent. 2 1 The
questions did not include a specific question regarding scoliosis and there
2 2
was no specific reference to the disease on the completed application. 1
Streeter did answer "no" to questions regarding respiratory problems
and disorders of the muscles and bones, including the spine. 2 3 Streeter
supplemented his answer with an explanation, however, even though only
"yes" answers required an explanation. 214 The agent who wrote in the
answers noted that Streeter's spine had been fused in October of 1980
and that he had fully recovered and would accept a rider of limitation
of coverage.2 15 The name, address, and telephone number of the treating
26
physician was also provided in the answer.

200. Id.
201. Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 253, 784 P.2d 992, 996 (1989).

202. Id.
203. Douglass, 42 N.M. at 197, 76 P.2d at 457.
204. Ellingwood v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co., III N.M. 301, 805 P.2d 70 (1991).
205. 111 N.M. 301, 805 P.2d 70 (1091).
206. Id. at 302, 805 P.2d at 71.
207. Id. Streeter wore a back brace and had a very short neck and torso, which was so severe
that his chin appeared to rest on his chest. Id. at 307, 805 P.2d at 76.
208. Id. at 302, 805 P.2d at 71.

209. Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302-03, 805 P.2d at 72-73.
Id. at 303, 805 P.2d at 73.
Id.
Id.
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Streeter paid the first premium directly to the agent, which was due
for the health and life insurance. 2 7 Streeter's grandmother was present
at the time, and she later testified that the agent told Streeter that
coverage began as soon as he paid his premium. 2 8 Streeter then signed
the application, which included various limiting clauses. 21 9 Directly above
Streeter's signature was the following language: "I understand that coverage is not effective unless and until approved and issued by the
company.' '220 He also signed another form that stated that he answered
the questions on the application to the best of his knowledge and that
nothing was left out of the answers. 221
The application was then sent to the underwriting department, which
issued Streeter a certificate of insurance for major medical and catastrophic
hospital expenses and term life insurance, based solely upon the information in the application. 222 The health insurance coverage excluded
coverage for "any disorder and/or disease of, or injury to, the cervical,
thoracic, lumbar or sacroiliac spine on James Streeter. ' 223 Both policies
excluded coverage for any illness that was a pre-existing condition. 224 The
certificate stated that the effective date of coverage for all policies was
12:00 noon, November 12, 1985. 221
On November 10, 1985, after a hunting trip, Streeter admitted himself
to the emergency room where he was diagnosed with severe bronchial
pneumonia. 226 Streeter died on November 12, at 3:40 a.m. 227 Soon thereafter, N.N. Investors began an investigation of Streeter's medical background and contacted the medical references on Streeter's application for
the first time. 228 N.N. Investors learned that Streeter's spinal surgery was
to correct a 'severe deformity associated with scoliosis which Mr. Streeter
had suffered since birth."', 9 The insurance company further learned that
Streeter had been admitted to the medical intensive care unit due to
pulmonary compromise during the 1980 hospitalization. 230 N.N. Investors

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 304, 805 P.2d at 73.
Id.
Id. A pre-existing condition was defined in the policy as:
a medical condition not disclosed on the application for which, prior to the effective
date of coverage
1) [miedical advice or treatment was recommended by, or received from a
Doctor within the five-year period before the effective date of coverage; or
2) [s]ymptoms existed which would cause an ordinary prudent person to seek
diagnosis, care or treatment within the five-year period before the effective
date of coverage.
Id.at 304 n.1, 805 P.2d at 73 n.l.
225. Id. at 304, 805 P.2d at 73.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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also claimed that Streeter was hospitalized at least thirteen other times
for treatment of scoliosis and was hospitalized for the treatment of
21
pneumonia three times when he was eighteen months of age.
N.N. Investors refused coverage on the grounds of 1) misrepresentation
and 2) the effective date of the policy had not been activated at the
time of treatment or death. 23 2 All premiums were returned upon recission
of the contract. 23 Patricia Ellingwood, the personal representative for
James Streeter, brought suit against N.N. Investors for breach of contract
and negligence. 23 4 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
N.N. Investors on grounds that the application stated the policy would
not be effective until approved by the company and that Streeter had
made material misrepresentations that gave the insurance company the
23 6
right of rescission. 235 Ellingwood appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that there were issues of fact
regarding the authority of an agent to bind the insurance company to
a contract for temporary insurance and whether Streeter had made material
misrepresentations. 237 The district court's granting of summary judgment
was reversed. 238
A.

Agent's Authority to Bind Insurer
The supreme court found that "[in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, an insurance agent may consummate a valid oral contract for
immediate coverage in order that an insured will not remain unprotected
during the interval prior to the issuance and delivery of a policy. ' 239
Because the agent told Streeter that coverage would begin upon payment
of the premium, the court stated that enough evidence was present to
submit the question to the jury. 24 The evidence was further supported
by affidavits from other customers of the agent showing that it.
was his
usual procedure to represent immediate coverage, despite the language
to the contrary in the policy. 24'
Furthermore, under New Mexico law, an agent may bind an insurer
by an oral agreement that coverage is to be effective immediately if it
is within the agent's apparent authority.2 2 Because the insurance company
authorized the agent to accept payment, it can be inferred that he had
the authority to begin immediate coverage. 243 Therefore, the supreme

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 302, 805 P.2d at 71.
at 305, 805 P.2d at 74.
at 309, 805 P.2d at 78.
at 305, 805 P.2d at 74.
at 306, 805 P.2d at 75 (citing COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d 14:33 (1984)).
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Court ruled that the question must be returned to the jury to determine
whether the agent had apparent authority to bind the insurance com244
pany.
Recision Because of Material Misrepresentations
According to New Mexico law, recision of an insurance contract is
permitted if there has been a misrepresentation of a material fact, the
misrepresentation was made to be relied upon, and the insurer did in
fact rely upon that misrepresentation. 245 It is immaterial whether 2the
misrepresentation was made fraudulently, negligently, or innocently. 4
In Ellingwood, the supreme court found that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of N.N. Investors with regard to
the allegation of the misrepresentations made by Streeter. 247 The supreme
court stated that N.N. Investors may have been given "inquiry notice"
24
with regard to Streeter's scoliosis from Streeter's physical appearance. 8
His condition was apparent from his severe physical deformity.
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that when an applicant gives
enough information to an insurance company to alert them of a medical
condition, it is the company's duty to make further investigation into
the circumstances. 249 An insurance company will be held responsible for
25 0
any information in medical records made available by the applicant.
Streeter provided the names and phone numbers of his family physician
and the surgeon who performed his spinal fusion. 25 ' He also signed a
release allowing N.N. Investors to obtain his medical records that were
in the possession of the named physicians.2 2 N.N. Investors failed to
make any investigation of the records prior to the filing of a claim for
benefits. 253 Therefore, the supreme court stated that it is a question for
the jury to determine if the company was put on inquiry notice, and
thus the case was returned for a jury verdict. 254 The ruling follows New
Mexico law by placing the burden on the insurer to investigate available
records of an applicant and by giving the benefit of the doubt to the
insured.
B.

C. Duty of Insurance Company to Defend Insured
In New Mexico, an insurance company is obligated to defend an insured
if the allegations in the third party complaint show that the accident or

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 306-07, 805 P.2d at 75-76.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anaya, 78 N.M. 101, 428 P.2d 640 (1967).
Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 661, 427 P.2d 21 (1967).
Ellingwood, I I1 N.M. at 307, 805 P.2d at 76.
Id. at 307-08, 805 P.2d at 76-77.
Id. at 308, 805 P.2d at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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occurrence comes within coverage of the policy.25 It is irrelevant whether
the third party complaintant can prove an action for damages or if the
insurance company can show through outside investigation that the claim
sued upon is not covered. 256 Additionally, once an insurance company
acts on behalf of the insured in litigation and the settlement of claims,
it assumes a fiduciary relationship and is under a duty to pursue the
25 7
case or to settle in good faith.
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed an insurer's duty to defend
once it has been determined that the case does not fall within the policy
of the insured. In American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Progressive
Casualty Co.,258 James Wade, the insured, had multiple sclerosis and had
to use a wheelchair. 259 American General issued a homeowner's policy
to Wade, excluding from coverage any injury arising out of the 'ownership, maintenance, or use' of a motor vehicle." 26° In addition, Wade
was covered by Progressive's automobile coverage. 261
Wade owned a van that was equipped for his wheelchair, allowing
him to be loaded and unloaded from the van. Wade required assistance
in loading or unloading from the van. 262 Jody Michael, an employee of
Wade's, was hired to assist Wade in activities that included his maneuvering in and out of the van. 263
Michael filed suit alleging that she was injured while helping Wade
move his wheelchair onto a ramp. 26 The complaint did not state that
the incident involved Wade's disability equipped van. 265 Therefore, American General proceeded to defend Wade in the suit under his home
owner's policy, based upon the allegations in the complaint. 266 When
American General discovered that the injury occurred while Michael was
assisting Wade from the van, it requested Wade to notify his automobile
insurance carrier be cause the homeowner's policy specifically excluded
coverage for injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle. 267 Progressive
26
refused to defend Wade. 8
American General formally demanded that Progressive defend Wade
and reimburse American General for its expenses incurred in the defense. 269
Progressive "claimed that it provided no coverage for Wade in this

255. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Mullenix, 97 N.M. 618, 619, 642 P.2d 604, 605 (1982) (citing
American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 85 N.M. 346, 512 P.2d 674 (1973)).
256. Id.
257. Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 430, 553 P.2d 703, 710 (Ct. App. 1976).
258. 110 N.M. 741, 799 P.2d 1113 (1990).
259. Id. at 742, 799 P.2d at 1114.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 743, 799 P.2d at Ill5.
269. Id.
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Progressive asserted a general policy exclusion . 27 Progressive

also raised a defense that the injury did not arise out of the "ownership,
maintenance, or use"

of the insured vehicle.

72

The suit with Michael

settled for $16,000, and American General incurred costs of $5,000 in
defending Wade. 273 American General then brought suit against Progressive
for breach of contract, violation of statute, and bad faith.2 74 The district
court granted Progressive's motion to dismiss, ruling that Progressive
the insured. 27 The New Mexico Supreme Court
had no duty to defend 276
reversed and remanded.

Progressive argued that American General continued to represent Wade
as a volunteer once it knew that the case was not covered under his
policy. 27 7 The court disagreed, stating that because representation began

before it was clear that the policy did not cover the injury, American

General could not be classified as a volunteer. 27 1 Moreover, American

General's duty to defend arose from the complaint that appeared to
implicate the homeowner's coverage. 279 Therefore, American General was
obligated to deal with Wade as a fiduciary and was under a duty to
pursue the case or settle the case in good faith. 2 0
The supreme court stated that it was Progressive who forced American
General to continue defending Wade by refusing to provide a defense.2 8,
Consequently, Progressive could not "hide behind its own misdeeds to
force American General to bear the burden of the defense. '

2

2

The court

held that American General was not acting as a volunteer, its defense
270. Id.
271. Id. The relevant portion of Progressive's insurance policy stated:
We will pay, on behalf of any insured person, damages, other than punitive damages,
for which an insured person is legally liable because of bodily injury and property
damage caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use
of your insured car or utility trailer.
We will defend any suit or settle any claim for these damages, as wE think
appropriate.
Id.(emphasis in original).
272. Id. The court addressed the issue of the injuries arising out of the "ownership, maintenance,
or use" of the insured vehicle by citing Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 783 P.2d 465 (1989).
Sanchez stated that if the use made of the vehicle at the time of the accident logically flows from
and is consistent with the foreseeable uses of that vehicle, then the injury arises out of the "ownership,
maintenance, or use" of the vehicle. Id. at 157, 783 P.2d at 467. In Sanchez, a hunter shot himself
in the foot while trying to unload a gun in a truck. The court found it foreseeable that the truck
would be used for hunting. Thus, loading or unloading weapons while in the vehicle was foreseeable.
Id. Applying the same reasoning to the case at hand, the court found that it was foreseeable for
Wade to be loaded and unloaded from the van by a hydraulic lift, and therefore the cause of the
accident was connected to the use of the van. American General, 110 N.M. at 744, 799 P.2d at
1116.
273. Id. at 743, 799 P.2d at IllS.
274. Id. at 742, 799 P.2d at 1114.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.at 744, 799 P.2d at 1116.
278. Id.at 745, 799 P.2d at 1117.
279. Id.at 744, 799 P.2d at 1116.
280. Id.
281. Id.at 745, 799 P.2d at 1117.
282. Id.
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"was required by law and its -fiduciary obligations to the insured," and
therefore
was entitled to subrogation for the costs of the defense in good
28 3
faith.
MARIE McCULLOCH
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